ImageValidatingPolicy
The Kyverno ImageValidatingPolicy type is a Kyverno policy type designed for verifying container image signatures and attestations.
Additional Fields
Section titled “Additional Fields”The ImageValidatingPolicy extends the Kyverno ValidatingPolicy with the following additional fields for image verification features. A complete reference is provided in the API specification.
images
Section titled “images”When Kubernetes resources are evaluated images for pods and pod templates are automatically extracted for processing. For custom resources, or for JSON payloads, the images field can be used to declare CEL expressions that extract images from the payload.
For example, this policy declaration will process the image specified in the imageReference field:
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: ImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: samplespec: evaluation: mode: JSON images: - name: imagerefs expression: "[object.imageReference]" ...matchImageReferences
Section titled “matchImageReferences”The spec.matchImageReferences field defines rules for matching container images. It allows specifying glob patterns or CEL expressions that specify which images the policy should match.
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: ImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: check-imagesspec: matchImageReferences: # At least one sub-field is required - glob: "ghcr.io/kyverno/*" # Match images using glob pattern - expression: "image.registry == 'ghcr.io'" # Match using CEL expression ...attestors
Section titled “attestors”The attestors field declares trusted signing authorities, such as keys or certificates.
Cosign attestors: These use public keys, keyless signing, transparency logs, certificates, or TUF-based metadata for image validation.
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: ImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: check-imagesspec: matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: [""] apiVersions: ["v1"] operations: ["CREATE"] resources: ["pods"] variables: - name: cm expression: >- resource.Get("v1", "configmaps", object.metadata.namespace, "keys") attestors: - name: cosign # A unique name to identify this attestor cosign: key: # Public key-based verification and At least one sub-field is required expression: variables.cm.data.pubKey # CEL expression that resolves to the public key kms: "gcpkms://..." # KMS URI for key verification (e.g., GCP KMS, AWS KMS) hashAlgorithm: "sha256" # Optional hash algorithm used with the key data: | # Direct inline public key data (optional if secretRef or kms is used) -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- ... -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
keyless: # Keyless signing verification (OIDC-based) identities: # List of accepted signing identities - subject: "https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/.github/workflows/deploy.yaml@refs/heads/main" issuer: "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" subjectRegExp: ".*github\\.com/.*/.*/.github/workflows/.*" # Optional regex for subject matching issuerRegExp: "https://token\\.actions\\.githubusercontent\\.com" # Optional regex for issuer matching roots: | # Roots is an optional set of PEM encoded trusted root certificates. If not provided, the system roots are used. -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ... -----END CERTIFICATE-----
ctlog: # Transparency log settings (e.g., Rekor) url: "https://rekor.sigstore.dev" rekorPubKey: | # Public key for verifying Rekor entries -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- ... -----END PUBLIC KEY----- ctLogPubKey: | # Public key for verifying CT log entries (optional) -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- ... -----END PUBLIC KEY----- tsaCertChain: | # Certificate chain for Time Stamp Authority (optional) -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- insecureIgnoreTlog: false # Skip TLog verification (for testing only) insecureIgnoreSCT: false # Skip Signed Certificate Timestamp (for testing only)
certificate: # Certificate-based verification and At least one sub-field is required cert: value: | # Inline signing certificate -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- expression: variables.cm.data.cert # CEL expression resolving to certificate certChain: # At least one sub-field is required value: | # Certificate chain associated with the signer o -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- expression: variables.cm.data.certChain # CEL expression resolving to certificate
source: # Optional metadata to constrain image source (optional) repository: "ghcr.io/myorg/myimage" # Limit to specific image repo pullSecrets: # Kubernetes secrets used to access the registry - name: my-registry-secret tagPrefix: "v1." # Restrict verification to images starting with this tag
tuf: root: path: "/var/run/tuf/root.json" # Local path to TUF root metadata (optional) data: | # Optional base64-encoded TUF root metadata (optional) eyJzaWduZWQiOiB7Li4ufSwgInNpZ25hdHVyZXMiOiBbLi4uXX0= mirror: "https://tuf.example.org" # Sigstore TUF mirror URL (optional)
...Notary attestors: These use certificates and optional Time Stamp Authority (TSA) certificates for image signature verification.
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: ImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: check-imagesspec: matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: [""] apiVersions: ["v1"] operations: ["CREATE"] resources: ["pods"] variables: - name: cm expression: >- resource.Get("v1", "configmaps", object.metadata.namespace, "keys") expression: - name: expression: matchImageReferences: - glob: ghcr.io/* attestors: - name: notary # Unique identifier for this attestor notary: certs: # At least one sub-field is required value: | # Certificate(s) used to verify the signature or CEL expression resolving to certificate(s) -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBjTCCATOgAwIBAgIUdMiN3gC... -----END CERTIFICATE-----
expression: variables.cm.data.cert # CEL expression resolving to certificate(s)
tsaCerts: # At least one sub-field is required value: | # Optional: Time Stamp Authority (TSA) certificates -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIC4jCCAcqgAwIBAgIQAm3T2tWk... -----END CERTIFICATE-----
expression: variables.cm.data.tsaCert # Optional: CEL expression resolving to TSA certificate(s)attestations
Section titled “attestations”The attestations field specifies additional metadata to validate.
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: ImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: check-imagesspec: matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: [''] apiVersions: ['v1'] operations: ['CREATE'] resources: ['pods'] matchImageReferences: - glob: ghcr.io/* attestors: - name: notary notary: certs: value: |- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIBjTCCATOgAwIBAgIUdMiN3gC... -----END CERTIFICATE----- attestations: - name: sbom # Logical name for this attestation referrer: # Uses OCI artifact type for verification type: sbom/cyclone-dx
- name: toto # Another attestation named `toto` intoto: type: https://example.com/attestations/slsa-provenance/v0.2 # Predicate type URI for in-toto formatvalidationConfigurations
Section titled “validationConfigurations”The validationConfigurations field defines settings for mutating image tags to digests, verifying that images are using digests, and enforcing image validation requirements across policies.
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: ImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: check-imagesspec: matchImageReferences: - glob: ghcr.io/* validationConfigurations: mutateDigest: true # Mutates image tags to digests (recommended to avoid mutable tags). required: true # Enforces that images must be validated according to policies. verifyDigest: true # Ensures that images are verified with a digest instead of tags.credentials
Section titled “credentials”Credentials specify the authentication information required to securely access and interact with a registry.
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: ImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: check-imagesspec: matchImageReferences: - glob: ghcr.io/* credentials: allowInsecureRegistry: false # Deny insecure access to registries providers: # specifies whose authentication providers are provided - 'default' - 'google' - 'azure' - 'amazon' - 'github'
secrets: - 'my-registry-secret' # Secrets specifies a list of secrets that are provided for credentials. Secrets must live in the Kyverno namespace.Policy Scope
Section titled “Policy Scope”ImageValidatingPolicy comes in both cluster-scoped and namespaced versions:
ImageValidatingPolicy: Cluster-scoped, applies to image verification across all namespacesNamespacedImageValidatingPolicy: Namespace-scoped, applies image verification only to resources within the same namespace
Both policy types have identical functionality and field structure. The only difference is the scope of resource selection.
Example NamespacedImageValidatingPolicy
Section titled “Example NamespacedImageValidatingPolicy”apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: NamespacedImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: verify-team-images namespace: developmentspec: matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: [''] apiVersions: ['v1'] operations: [CREATE, UPDATE] resources: [pods] matchImageReferences: - glob: 'ghcr.io/myorg/dev-*' attestors: - name: dev-attestor cosign: keyless: identities: - issuer: 'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com' subject: '*@myorg.github.io' validations: - message: 'image must be signed by the development team' expression: 'imageverify.verify(images.containers, attestors.devAttestor).all(result, result.verified)'The NamespacedImageValidatingPolicy allows namespace owners to manage image verification policies without requiring cluster-admin permissions. This enables development teams to enforce their own image security requirements, such as verifying images are signed by their CI/CD pipeline, without affecting other namespaces or requiring cluster-level access.
Kyverno CEL Libraries
Section titled “Kyverno CEL Libraries”Kyverno enhances Kubernetes’ CEL environment with libraries enabling complex policy logic and advanced features for image validation. In addition to common Kyverno CEL Libraries the following additional libraries are supported for ImageValidatingPolicy types.
Image Verification Library
Section titled “Image Verification Library”Kyverno provides specialized functions for verifying image signatures and attestations:
| CEL Expression | Purpose |
|---|---|
images.containers | Retrieves all container images in the resource |
verifyImageSignatures(image, [attestors.notary]) | Verify image signatures using specified attestors |
verifyAttestationSignatures(image, attestations.sbom, [attestors.notary]) | Verify attestation signatures for specific metadata |
extractPayload(image, attestations.sbom).bomFormat == 'CycloneDX' | Extract the in-toto payload |
The following policy demonstrates the use of these functions:
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: ImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: check-imagesspec: matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: [''] apiVersions: ['v1'] operations: ['CREATE'] resources: ['pods'] matchImageReferences: - glob: ghcr.io/* attestors: - name: notary notary: certs: value: |- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- attestations: - name: sbom referrer: type: sbom/cyclone-dx validations: - expression: >- images.containers.map(image, verifyImageSignatures(image, [attestors.notary])).all(e, e > 0) message: failed to verify image with notary cert - expression: >- images.containers.map(image, verifyAttestationSignatures(image, attestations.sbom, [attestors.notary])).all(e, e > 0) message: failed to verify attestation with notary cert - expression: >- images.containers.map(image, extractPayload(image, attestations.sbom).bomFormat == 'CycloneDX').all(e, e) message: sbom is not a cyclone dx sbomThis policy ensures that:
- All images are signed by the specified notary attestor
- All images have valid SBOM attestations
- All SBOMs are in CycloneDX format
Cosign Keyless Signature and Attestation Verification
Section titled “Cosign Keyless Signature and Attestation Verification”This sample policy demonstrates how to verify container image signatures using Cosign keyless signing and validate the presence of a vulnerability scan attestation.
Kyverno supports the use of regular expressions in identities.subjectRegExp and identities.issuerRegExp fields when configuring keyless attestors
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: ImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: require-vulnerability-scanspec: validationActions: [Audit] webhookConfiguration: timeoutSeconds: 15 failurePolicy: Fail matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: [''] apiVersions: ['v1'] resources: ['pods'] operations: ['CREATE', 'UPDATE'] matchImageReferences: - glob: 'ghcr.io/myorg/myrepo:*' attestors: - name: cosign cosign: keyless: identities: - subject: 'https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/.github/workflows/*' issuer: 'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com' ctlog: url: 'https://rekor.sigstore.dev' attestations: - name: cosignAttestation intoto: type: cosign.sigstore.dev/attestation/vuln/v1 validations: - expression: >- images.containers.map(image, verifyImageSignatures(image, [attestors.cosign])).all(e, e > 0) message: 'Failed image signature verification' - expression: >- images.containers.map(image, verifyAttestationSignatures(image, attestations.cosignAttestation, [attestors.cosign])).all(e, e > 0) message: 'Failed to verify vulnerability scan attestation with Cosign keyless'Cosign Public Key Signature Verification
Section titled “Cosign Public Key Signature Verification”This policy ensures that container images are signed with a specified Cosign public key before being admitted.
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1alpha1kind: ImageValidatingPolicymetadata: name: verify-image-ivpolspec: webhookConfiguration: timeoutSeconds: 15 evaluation: background: enabled: false validationActions: [Deny] matchConstraints: resourceRules: - apiGroups: [''] apiVersions: ['v1'] operations: ['CREATE', 'UPDATE'] resources: ['pods'] matchImageReferences: - glob: 'docker.io/kyverno/kyverno*' attestors: - name: cosign cosign: key: data: | -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE6QsNef3SKYhJVYSVj+ZfbPwJd0pv DLYNHXITZkhIzfE+apcxDjCCkDPcJ3A3zvhPATYOIsCxYPch7Q2JdJLsDQ== -----END PUBLIC KEY----- validations: - expression: >- images.containers.map(image, verifyImageSignatures(image, [attestors.cosign])).all(e ,e > 0) message: >- failed the image Signature verificationNote: To learn how to sign container images using Cosign with keyless signing, refer to the official Cosign documentation. Policies are applied cluster-wide to help secure your cluster. However, there may be times when teams or users need to test specific tools or resources. In such cases, users can use PolicyException to bypass policies without modifying or tweaking the policies themselves. This ensures that your policies remain secure while providing the flexibility to bypass them when needed.